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<h1>Flawfinder Results</h1>
Here are the security scan results from
<a href="http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder">Flawfinder version 1.27</a>,
(C) 2001-2004 <a href="http://www.dwheeler.com">David A. Wheeler</a>.
Number of dangerous functions in C/C++ ruleset: 158
<p>
Examining test.c <br>
Examining test2.c <br>
<ul>
<li>test.c:32: <b> [5] </b> (buffer) <i> gets:
Does not check for buffer overflows. Use fgets() instead. </i>
<pre>
gets(f);
</pre>
<li>test.c:56: <b> [5] </b> (buffer) <i> strncat:
Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct
maximum size to add). Consider strlcat or automatically resizing strings.
Risk is high; the length parameter appears to be a constant, instead of
computing the number of characters left. </i>
<pre>
strncat(d,s,sizeof(d)); /* Misuse - this should be flagged as riskier. */
</pre>
<li>test.c:57: <b> [5] </b> (buffer) <i> _tcsncat:
Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct
maximum size to add). Consider strlcat or automatically resizing strings.
Risk is high; the length parameter appears to be a constant, instead of
computing the number of characters left. </i>
<pre>
_tcsncat(d,s,sizeof(d)); /* Misuse - flag as riskier */
</pre>
<li>test.c:60: <b> [5] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes. Risk is high, it
appears that the size is given as bytes, but the function requires size as
characters. </i>
<pre>
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof(wszUserName));
</pre>
<li>test.c:62: <b> [5] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes. Risk is high, it
appears that the size is given as bytes, but the function requires size as
characters. </i>
<pre>
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof wszUserName);
</pre>
<li>test.c:73: <b> [5] </b> (misc) <i> SetSecurityDescriptorDacl:
Never create NULL ACLs; an attacker can set it to Everyone (Deny All
Access), which would even forbid administrator access. </i>
<pre>
SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(&amp;sd,TRUE,NULL,FALSE);
</pre>
<li>test.c:73: <b> [5] </b> (misc) <i> SetSecurityDescriptorDacl:
Never create NULL ACLs; an attacker can set it to Everyone (Deny All
Access), which would even forbid administrator access. </i>
<pre>
SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(&amp;sd,TRUE,NULL,FALSE);
</pre>
<li>test.c:17: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination.
Consider using strncpy or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily misused). </i>
<pre>
strcpy(b, a);
</pre>
<li>test.c:20: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
Does not check for buffer overflows. Use snprintf or vsnprintf. </i>
<pre>
sprintf(s, "hello %s", bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:21: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
Does not check for buffer overflows. Use snprintf or vsnprintf. </i>
<pre>
sprintf(s, gettext("hello %s"), bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:22: <b> [4] </b> (format) <i> sprintf:
Potential format string problem. Make format string constant. </i>
<pre>
sprintf(s, unknown, bug);
</pre>
<li>test.c:23: <b> [4] </b> (format) <i> printf:
If format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can be
exploited. Use a constant for the format specification. </i>
<pre>
printf(bf, x);
</pre>
<li>test.c:25: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
The scanf() family's %s operation, without a limit specification,
permits buffer overflows. Specify a limit to %s, or use a different input
function. </i>
<pre>
scanf("%s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:27: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
The scanf() family's %s operation, without a limit specification,
permits buffer overflows. Specify a limit to %s, or use a different input
function. </i>
<pre>
scanf("%s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:38: <b> [4] </b> (format) <i> syslog:
If syslog's format strings can be influenced by an attacker, they can
be exploited. Use a constant format string for syslog. </i>
<pre>
syslog(LOG_ERR, attacker_string);
</pre>
<li>test.c:49: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> _mbscpy:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination.
Consider using a function version that stops copying at the end of the
buffer. </i>
<pre>
_mbscpy(d,s); /* like strcpy, this doesn't check for buffer overflow */
</pre>
<li>test.c:52: <b> [4] </b> (buffer) <i> lstrcat:
Does not check for buffer overflows when concatenating to destination. </i>
<pre>
lstrcat(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:75: <b> [3] </b> (shell) <i> CreateProcess:
This causes a new process to execute and is difficult to use safely.
Specify the application path in the first argument, NOT as part of the
second, or embedded spaces could allow an attacker to force a different
program to run. </i>
<pre>
CreateProcess(NULL, "C:\\Program Files\\GoodGuy\\GoodGuy.exe -x", "");
</pre>
<li>test.c:75: <b> [3] </b> (shell) <i> CreateProcess:
This causes a new process to execute and is difficult to use safely.
Specify the application path in the first argument, NOT as part of the
second, or embedded spaces could allow an attacker to force a different
program to run. </i>
<pre>
CreateProcess(NULL, "C:\\Program Files\\GoodGuy\\GoodGuy.exe -x", "");
</pre>
<li>test.c:91: <b> [3] </b> (buffer) <i> getopt_long:
Some older implementations do not protect against internal buffer
overflows . Check implementation on installation, or limit the size of all
string inputs. </i>
<pre>
while ((optc = getopt_long (argc, argv, "a",longopts, NULL )) != EOF) {
</pre>
<li>test.c:16: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination.
Consider using strncpy or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily misused). Risk
is low because the source is a constant string. </i>
<pre>
strcpy(a, gettext("Hello there")); // Did this work?
</pre>
<li>test.c:19: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
Does not check for buffer overflows. Use snprintf or vsnprintf. Risk
is low because the source has a constant maximum length. </i>
<pre>
sprintf(s, "hello");
</pre>
<li>test.c:45: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> char:
Statically-sized arrays can be overflowed. Perform bounds checking,
use functions that limit length, or ensure that the size is larger than
the maximum possible length. </i>
<pre>
char d[20];
</pre>
<li>test.c:46: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> char:
Statically-sized arrays can be overflowed. Perform bounds checking,
use functions that limit length, or ensure that the size is larger than
the maximum possible length. </i>
<pre>
char s[20];
</pre>
<li>test.c:50: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> memcpy:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination. Make
sure destination can always hold the source data. </i>
<pre>
memcpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:51: <b> [2] </b> (buffer) <i> CopyMemory:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination. Make
sure destination can always hold the source data. </i>
<pre>
CopyMemory(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:97: <b> [2] </b> (misc) <i> fopen:
Check when opening files - can an attacker redirect it (via symlinks),
force the opening of special file type (e.g., device files), move
things around to create a race condition, control its ancestors, or change
its contents?. </i>
<pre>
f = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
</pre>
<li>test.c:15: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strcpy:
Does not check for buffer overflows when copying to destination.
Consider using strncpy or strlcpy (warning, strncpy is easily misused). Risk
is low because the source is a constant character. </i>
<pre>
strcpy(a, "\n"); // Did this work?
</pre>
<li>test.c:18: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> sprintf:
Does not check for buffer overflows. Use snprintf or vsnprintf. Risk
is low because the source is a constant character. </i>
<pre>
sprintf(s, "\n");
</pre>
<li>test.c:26: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> scanf:
it's unclear if the %s limit in the format string is small enough.
Check that the limit is sufficiently small, or use a different input
function. </i>
<pre>
scanf("%10s", s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:53: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strncpy:
Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always \0-terminate or check for
invalid pointers. </i>
<pre>
strncpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:54: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> _tcsncpy:
Easily used incorrectly; doesn't always \0-terminate or check for
invalid pointers. </i>
<pre>
_tcsncpy(d,s);
</pre>
<li>test.c:55: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strncat:
Easily used incorrectly (e.g., incorrectly computing the correct
maximum size to add). Consider strlcat or automatically resizing strings. </i>
<pre>
strncat(d,s,10);
</pre>
<li>test.c:58: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> strlen:
Does not handle strings that are not \0-terminated (it could cause a
crash if unprotected). </i>
<pre>
n = strlen(d);
</pre>
<li>test.c:64: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes. Risk is very low,
the length appears to be in characters not bytes. </i>
<pre>
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof(wszUserName)/sizeof(wszUserName[0]));
</pre>
<li>test.c:66: <b> [1] </b> (buffer) <i> MultiByteToWideChar:
Requires maximum length in CHARACTERS, not bytes. Risk is very low,
the length appears to be in characters not bytes. </i>
<pre>
MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP,0,szName,-1,wszUserName,sizeof wszUserName /sizeof(wszUserName[0]));
</pre>
</ul>
<p>
Hits = 36
<br>
Lines analyzed = 118
<br>
Physical Source Lines of Code (SLOC) = 80
<br>
Hits@level = [0] 0 [1] 9 [2] 7 [3] 3 [4] 10 [5] 7 <br>
Hits@level+ = [0+] 36 [1+] 36 [2+] 27 [3+] 20 [4+] 17 [5+] 7 <br>
Hits/KSLOC@level+ = [0+] 450 [1+] 450 [2+] 337.5 [3+] 250 [4+] 212.5 [5+] 87.5 <br>
Suppressed hits = 2 (use --neverignore to show them)
<br>
Minimum risk level = 1
<br>
Not every hit is necessarily a security vulnerability.
<br>
There may be other security vulnerabilities; review your code!
</body>
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