[trunk] Import commit f4139d702559649e577a5df9cfd64b0ca6107a7a from ghostpdl

Several functions accept a buffer size but never actually check whether
the buffer overflows during reading/writing. This fixes all cases where
a size variable has explicitly been marked as unused (through a (void)
cast).

This was discovered while investigating an assertion caused by
7cc691f332f26802c64cdc47e17bff8b_signal_sigabrt_7ffff6d59425_2247_2509.pdf
among others.

Thanks to Mateusz Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind of the Google Security
Team for providing the example files.
This commit is contained in:
Mathieu Malaterre 2014-02-25 13:28:37 +00:00
parent 3ca312033f
commit 876c02206d
2 changed files with 28 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_event_msg(opj_event_mgr_t* p_event_mgr, OPJ_INT32 event_type, const
str_length = (strlen(fmt) > OPJ_MSG_SIZE) ? OPJ_MSG_SIZE : strlen(fmt);
(void)str_length;
/* parse the format string and put the result in 'message' */
vsprintf(message, fmt, arg); /* UniPG */
vsnprintf(message, OPJ_MSG_SIZE, fmt, arg); /* UniPG */
/* deinitialize the optional parameter list */
va_end(arg);

View File

@ -837,6 +837,7 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_pclr( opj_jp2_t *jp2,
OPJ_UINT16 nr_entries,nr_channels;
OPJ_UINT16 i, j;
OPJ_UINT32 l_value;
OPJ_BYTE *orig_header_data = p_pclr_header_data;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_pclr_header_data != 00);
@ -847,6 +848,9 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_pclr( opj_jp2_t *jp2,
if(jp2->color.jp2_pclr)
return OPJ_FALSE;
if (p_pclr_header_size < 3)
return OPJ_FALSE;
opj_read_bytes(p_pclr_header_data, &l_value , 2); /* NE */
p_pclr_header_data += 2;
nr_entries = (OPJ_UINT16) l_value;
@ -855,6 +859,9 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_pclr( opj_jp2_t *jp2,
++p_pclr_header_data;
nr_channels = (OPJ_UINT16) l_value;
if (p_pclr_header_size < 3 + (OPJ_UINT32)nr_channels || nr_channels == 0 || nr_entries >= (OPJ_UINT32)-1 / nr_channels)
return OPJ_FALSE;
entries = (OPJ_UINT32*) opj_malloc(nr_channels * nr_entries * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (!entries)
return OPJ_FALSE;
@ -902,6 +909,11 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_pclr( opj_jp2_t *jp2,
for(i = 0; i < nr_channels; ++i) {
OPJ_INT32 bytes_to_read = (channel_size[i]+7)>>3;
if (bytes_to_read > sizeof(OPJ_UINT32))
bytes_to_read = sizeof(OPJ_UINT32);
if ((ptrdiff_t)p_pclr_header_size < p_pclr_header_data - orig_header_data + bytes_to_read)
return OPJ_FALSE;
opj_read_bytes(p_pclr_header_data, &l_value , bytes_to_read); /* Cji */
p_pclr_header_data += bytes_to_read;
*entries = (OPJ_UINT32) l_value;
@ -943,6 +955,11 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_cmap( opj_jp2_t * jp2,
}
nr_channels = jp2->color.jp2_pclr->nr_channels;
if (p_cmap_header_size < (OPJ_UINT32)nr_channels * 4) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Insufficient data for CMAP box.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
cmap = (opj_jp2_cmap_comp_t*) opj_malloc(nr_channels * sizeof(opj_jp2_cmap_comp_t));
if (!cmap)
return OPJ_FALSE;
@ -1022,6 +1039,11 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_cdef( opj_jp2_t * jp2,
* inside a JP2 Header box.'*/
if(jp2->color.jp2_cdef) return OPJ_FALSE;
if (p_cdef_header_size < 2) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Insufficient data for CDEF box.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
opj_read_bytes(p_cdef_header_data,&l_value ,2); /* N */
p_cdef_header_data+= 2;
@ -1030,6 +1052,11 @@ OPJ_BOOL opj_jp2_read_cdef( opj_jp2_t * jp2,
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (p_cdef_header_size < 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)(OPJ_UINT16)l_value * 6) {
opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR, "Insufficient data for CDEF box.\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
cdef_info = (opj_jp2_cdef_info_t*) opj_malloc(l_value * sizeof(opj_jp2_cdef_info_t));
if (!cdef_info)
return OPJ_FALSE;