diff --git a/abi-check/changelog/openjpeg/current/log.html b/abi-check/changelog/openjpeg/current/log.html
index d5532380..40b81c41 100644
--- a/abi-check/changelog/openjpeg/current/log.html
+++ b/abi-check/changelog/openjpeg/current/log.html
@@ -20,7 +20,13 @@
commit 67ec360f48aeded95d06578e717bdf40a8e6d16f +commit eaa098b59b346cb88e4d10d505061f669d7134fc +Author: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> +Date: 2020-11-23 13:49:05 +0100 + + Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (fixes #1283) + +commit 67ec360f48aeded95d06578e717bdf40a8e6d16f Author: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com> Date: 2020-11-23 13:38:27 +0100 @@ -898,23 +904,6 @@ Date: 2018-12-21 16:41:00 +0100 convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early (CVE-2018-6616) -commit 8ee335227bbcaf1614124046aa25e53d67b11ec3 -Author: Hugo Lefeuvre <hle@debian.org> -Date: 2018-12-14 04:58:40 +0100 - - convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early - - width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily - valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large - values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack - overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early - as possible. - - This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of - written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length. - - Fixes #1059 (CVE-2018-6616). - ...